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Abstract: This paper examines the roles of accounting and costing in 
the management of coal mining during the Industrial Revolution in 
Britain, and considers the impact of the agent's reputat ion in the 
development and use of these systems. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with the accounting and costing systems 
employed during the British Industrial Revolution at Tanfield 
Moor Colliery in North East England. The paper has three ob-
jectives: (1), to add to the body of research [Edwards, 1989; 
Fleischman and Parker, 1991] that questions the view of Pollard 
[1965, p.248] that "the practice of using accounts as direct aids 
to management was not one of the achievements of the British 
Industrial Revolution"; (2), to challenge the expectation of 
Fleischman and Parker [p.363] that "nascent cost accounting 
would flourish more notably in a factory environment" than in 
extractive industries; and (3), to examine the use of accounting 
and costing information by an absentee owner and his agent, 
and in doing so, to provide some reflections on principal-agent 
relationships and organisational control. The paper is organised 
into three main sections. In the first section, the context is set 
by means of a review of the relevant literature of the coal indus-
try. In the second section, aspects of agency theory are outlined 
and a detailed examination is undertaken of the accounting and 
costing systems employed in the particular context of Tanfield 
Moor Colliery. Finally, the implications of the current research 
are considered. 
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THE CONTEXT 
The "Bibliography of the British Coal Industry" [Benson, 
1981] indicates a vast literature on the British Coal Industry. 
However, in setting the context for the current paper, the 
present author has noted the caveat expressed in the definitive 
series "The History of the British Coal Industry": coal was a 
regional industry rather than a national one. Although this ca-
veat was expressed [Hatcher, 1993, p.vi) in relation to the pe-
riod up to 1700, "intense regional diversity" [Church, 1986, p.2] 
continued to characterise the industry throughout the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus the contextual analysis of 
the current paper is based on North East England in particular, 
and factors relating to other regional or to national circum-
stances are drawn into the analysis only if they are directly 
relevant. 
The North East of England is made up of two counties, 
Northumberland and Durham, and has three major rivers that 
lead to the sea: the rivers Tyne, Wear and Tees. Access to the 
sea was crucial to the development of the Nor th East as 
Britain's premier coal mining region. Coal is an extremely bulky 
and heavy commodity in relation to its market value, making its 
overland transport difficult and costly. Water transport was the 
only cost-effective means of transporting coal over long dis-
tances: in 1675 Sir Robert Southwell considered that transport-
ing coal from Newcastle Upon Tyne to London by an overland 
route was sixty times more expensive than by the sea route 
[Hatcher, 1993, p. 13]. The North East was unique in having 
ample coal deposits, access to the sea and being within striking 
distance of the key market of London. Thus the North East was 
well placed to respond when the demand for coal grew in the 
London market under the pressures of rising population, in-
creasing industrialisation and the depletion of timber-fuel re-
serves. Although precise output figures are a matter of great 
debate there is a consensus [e.g. Blake, 1967; Hatcher, 1993; 
Nef, 1932], that the late sixteenth century marked the first great 
expansion of the region's coal industry. Output rose from 
90,000 tons in 1560, c. 40 per cent of national output , to 
1,250,000 tons in 1700, c.47 per cent of na t ional ou tpu t 
[Hatcher, 1993, p.68], to about 3 million tons in 1775, c.34 per 
cent of national output, and to about 7 million tons in 1830, 
c.23 per cent of national output. This reduction in national 
dominance took place as industrial demand for coal grew 
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throughout the country and facilitated supply by other coal 
fields. 
Between 1805-1830, the North-East coal trade was domi-
nated by the Joint Durham and Northumberland Coal Owners 
Association [Flinn, 1984, p.256]. The major function of the joint 
association was to enhance colliery profits by restricting output 
and eliminating price competition. The total "vend" or sale of 
coal was fixed by a central committee that allocated quotas to 
collieries on a fortnightly or monthly basis, levying heavy fines 
for excess output. At times, as in periods during 1818-19, 1820, 
1822, 1826 and 1829, failure to agree the sub-division of the 
vend between collieries led to open trade [ibid., p.263]. The 
regulation of sales referred only to "sea-sale" coal, that is to 
coal t ransported by sea ra ther than by land. However the 
North-East's principal markets were "sea-sale" being mainly 
along the east coast and in London. In supplying these markets 
the North-East coal field produced about 3 million tons of coal 
in 1775, c.34 per cent of national output, and about 7 million 
tons of coal in 1830, c. 23 per cent of national output, However 
in 1830 the North-East "was still the acknowledged leader in 
technology, in the skill of its miners, and in the expertise of its 
managers" [ibid., p.28]. Members of the senior managerial class 
were known as "viewers", a term derived from the verb "to 
view", that is to survey, a colliery. In the North-East the term 
viewer was applied to colliery managers, in the paid employ-
ment of the owners, and also to independent professional ex-
perts who provided their services on a freelance basis. Essen-
tially, the task of an employed manager was to run the day-to 
day operations of the colliery, whilst the independent profes-
sional "advised and directed larger issues of colliery design, 
construction and development" [ibid., p.58]. Professional view-
ers "were a mixture of manager, engineer, surveyor, accountant 
and agent" [ibid., p.59] and attracted their own "schools" of 
assistants and apprentices. There were three great schools in 
the North-East at the beginning of the nineteenth century: 
those of Buddie, Barnes and Johnson. Buddie was "the doyen" 
[Burgess, 1986, p. 15], being viewer, agent, consultant and part-
owner in many of the region's leading collieries. Furthermore, 
from 1806-1831 Buddie was secretary to the Tyne Committee of 
the Joint Association and at times represented very powerful 
interests on the Wear Committee. Although the constitution of 
the Joint Association 
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allowed for democrat ic management , the extent to 
which it could be dominated by one man should not be 
underestimated....(Given) his immense reputation....(it) 
must have (been) very difficult to offer serious opposi-
t ion to Buddie on ei ther commit tee [Flinn, 1984, 
pp.261-2] 
It is clear that Buddie was the dominant coal-mining pro-
fessional of his era, and, in the midst of heavy, wide-ranging 
professional responsibilities, he chose to act as viewer and 
manager at only two collieries: at the mighty Wallsend Colliery 
and at the relatively minor Tanfield Moor Colliery [ibid., p.59]. 
Whereas Wallsend Colliery was owned by residents of the 
North-East who at times inter-linked ownership of Wallsend 
with partnerships in other collieries, Tanfield Moor was owned 
throughout Buddie's management by a single individual, Will-
iam Morton Pitt, who lived far away in the South-West of En-
gland. Thus, the archives relating to Tanfield Moor Colliery, 
housed at the Northumberland Record Office (NRO) and the 
Durham Record Office (DRO), provide a unique opportunity to 
analyse the roles of accounting and costing in the context of 
Buddie's management and in the context of the principal-agent 
relationship of Pitt, the absentee owner, and Buddie, the on-site 
manager. 
ACCOUNTING AND COSTING AT 
TANFIELD MOOR COLLIERY 
Introduction 
Based on a detailed study of the coal-mining industry of the 
British Industrial Revolution, Fleischman and Parker [forth-
coming] are set to overturn their previous expectation [1991, 
p.363] that "nascent cost accounting would flourish more nota-
bly in factory environment" than in extractive industries. Fol-
lowing particular searches in the archives of the North-East 
England coal industry, their forthcoming study will help to 
bring to a wider audience the wealth of this specific element of 
Britain's cost accounting heritage. Until now, this heritage has 
not been subject to great scrutiny by accounting historians but 
has long been used as a basis for studies by economic histori-
ans [e.g. Ashton and Sykes, 1964]. Recently Hatcher [1993] has 
noted that accounting and costing have long been of great im-
portance in the British coal industry in general and that of the 
North-East in particular. Having examined the archive evidence 
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Hatcher stated [p.305] that, prior to 1700, colliery accounts, 
whatever their deficiencies, were "among the most advanced of 
all forms of contemporary business accounts" and conclude 
[p.306] that 
few colliery accounts did not permit output, sales, 
costs and revenues to be calculated and mapped 
(and) information extracted from accounts could pro-
vide a serviceable basis for weighing the prospects of 
future ventures. Of the higher order data, cash flow 
was also normally discernible, and so too was the bal-
ance between output and sales, the average cost of pro-
ducing each unit of coal, and the average profit from 
its sale. Bookkeeping as p rac t i sed by very m a n y 
collieries, in all its eccentricity and lush profusion of 
styles, was a serviceable tool of management 
The Hatcher study is a work of a economic and social history 
that provides valuable early surveys of accounting and costing 
that indicate that these disciplines were well established in the 
British coal-mining industry prior to the Industrial Revolution. 
Thus the current work on accounting and costing in Tanfield 
Moor Colliery during the Industrial Revolution is set in the 
context of a developed and widely employed knowledge base. 
However by focusing on one specific colliery the current work 
can provide a wealth of a detailed evidence to add to the rather 
more generalised picture built up by the extant economic histo-
ries. 
Tanfield Moor Colliery 
The Pitt family, who lived in the South-West of England, 
claimed to have purchased Tanfield Moor Colliery in 1690 
[NRO Bud/22, p. 150]. The Pitts were absentee owners, who re-
lied upon others to manage the colliery for them. It is probable 
that in the late 1700s the colliery was managed on behalf of the 
Pitts by a family of local viewers, the Browns, who had con-
ducted a "view" of Tanfield Moor in 1764 [NRO, WAT 2/5, 
p.32]. In the Browns' "View Book" [NRO, WAT 2/5] there is a 
run of fortnightly reports for Tanfield Moor, dating from De-
cember 1776 - July 1778. Essentially these reports consisted of 
a listing of payments and a physical reconciliation of stocks, 
production and sales, and were prepared for "the use of John 
Pitt Esq.", the absentee owner of the colliery. The reports en-
able current researchers to gain some indication of the opera-
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tion of the colliery. The reports indicate that while the colliery 
was owned by Pitt and its viewers were the Browns, the mining 
of coal was undertaken by two contractors, James and William 
King, this form of mining organisation being widespread in the 
North-East between 1780 and 1815 [Taylor, 1960]. The colliery 
was the overall unit of organisation, and contained two differ-
ent pits, "the Willey pitt" and "the Brook pitt". As was common 
practice, over time individual pits were worked out and new 
pits opened within the continuing operations of the colliery. 
From the pit, the coal was transported to the staithes, or load-
ing points, on the River Tyne whence it was shipped down river 
on keel boats and transferred at sea to colliers which sailed 
down the East coast to sell the coal mainly at the London mar-
kets. In a draft pro-forma report of the 1790s [NRO Bud/22, 
pp.44-45], the system for reporting physical flows of coal was 
reformulated and a model "general" account developed to 
record transactions with the "fitter" (sales agent) and for cash. 
However, there is no evidence of either of these systems being 
used in practice. Nevertheless, the model general account does 
contain information on cash balances, receipts, payments and 
remittances to the owner that would probably have been of 
great value to an absentee owner. 
As an absentee owner, Pitt was particularly reliant upon his 
on-site managers. Much of Pitt's period of ownership was domi-
nated by two on-site managers, Nathaniel Clayton, Agent from 
1800-1822 and John Buddie, who was Pitt's Agent from 1822-
1836. Since the relationship between Pitt, on the one hand, and 
Clayton and Buddie, on the other, are clearly relationships be-
tween a principal and his agents, relevant elements of the 
agency literature are now reviewed in order to provide addi-
tional context prior to the detailed examination of Tanfield 
Moor's accounting and costing archive. Jensen and Meckling 
[1976, p.308] define an agency relationship as a contract under 
which the principal engages the agent to undertake work on his 
behalf whilst delegating some authority for decision making to 
the agent. They note that, at times, the agent may act to further 
his own interest rather than that of the principal, and that the 
principal can act to limit such tendencies by offering appropri-
ate incentives to the agent and by using monitoring systems 
designed to limit deviant activities by the agent. The agent may 
incur bonding costs to guarantee that he will not undertake 
certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure 
that the principal would be compensated for any such actions. 
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However despite incentives, monitoring and bonding, the prin-
cipal may suffer "residual loss" because of divergence between 
the agent's decisions and the decisions that would maximise the 
welfare of the principal. 
Pr incipal-agent re la t ionships were at the core of the 
"Memorandum of Agreement" [NRO Bud/22, pp.37-40] made in 
1800 when William Morton Pitt appointed Nathaniel Clayton of 
Newcastle as "his agent for the Management of his Colliery 
called Tanfield Moor...and his....Agent for selling the Coals 
thereof." Under the terms of the agreement, Clayton was to: 
• execute a bond of £5,000 to Pitt as a safeguard for his 
fulfilling the terms of the agreement; 
• keep "truly and faithfully" accounts of all his receipts 
and payments and render such accounts to Pitt or his 
representatives whenever required; 
• remit to Pitt or his representative any surplus cash not 
required to cover current expenditures, together with the 
relevant cash account; 
• present fortnightly reports of expenditures and physical 
flows of coal; and 
• present yearly cash accounts, within one month of the 
year-end, and pay any surplus cash balance to Pitt. 
In return, as his part of the agreement, Pitt was to: 
• pay Clayton £562 per annum to cover selling expenses; 
• cover all colliery expenses, except those connected with 
selling; and 
• pay Clayton for his services by means of a fixed sum of 
£400 per annum plus a further £12 "for every One Hun-
dred Pounds remitted...as profits....over and above the 
Clear Annual Sum of Three Thousand Three Hundred 
and Thirty Three Pounds, Six Shillings and Eight Pence. 
Under the agreement, Clayton was to have control over all 
personnel, but the books of account were deemed to be Pitt's 
property to be passed to him or his representatives on demand, 
although Clayton was free to make copies. Thus the Memoran-
dum of Agreement was a clear contract between principal and 
agent and it indicated that the accounting system was the key 
to the way in which Pitt, as principal, sought to protect his 
interests. The Memorandum indicates Pitt's intention to use the 
accounting system as a means of obtaining information on the 
colliery and its cash flows, and as a means of providing appro-
priate incentives to his agent. Unfortunately gaps in the archive 
prevent an analysis of how this principal-agent relationship ac-
7
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tually worked in practice. However, this arrangement continued 
until 1822 when concerns over the financial performance of the 
colliery and Clayton's effectiveness as Agent prompted Pitt to 
engage the services of John Buddie. 
John Buddie 
It is apparent that Buddie was aware of the moral hazards 
involved in principal-agent relationships and that he had clear 
views on setting incentives for agents. In 1813 he reported 
[NRO Bud/6, pp.61-2] to the owners of Water-house Colliery in 
Lancashire on profits that had failed to meet expectations: 
My surprise (at the low profits) subsided in a great 
measure, on being informed that the managers of some 
of the principal Collieries were allowed a premium on 
the number of Tons sold Yearly - not on the Profits....I 
don't wonder that the Price of Coals has been reduced 
from time to time, nor that it should still continue to 
be reduced, until such an absurd practice is abolished. 
Under this System, the interest of the Colliery propri-
etors and that of his Agent are completely at variance, 
and it is too much to expect of human nature that the 
Agent is to sacrifice his own interest to that of the 
employer. If an Agent is to be allowed any extra remu-
neration, at all, over and above his Yearly Salary, it 
ought surely to be on the Profits made not the quantity 
sold. 
The Tanfield Moor archive does not reveal any arranged or 
actual incentive payments to Buddie, and, apart from a "simple 
Money Bond" [NRO Bud/22, p.91] of £4,000 made by Buddie on 
taking up his post, does not contain any formal agreement 
made between Pitt and Buddie for the regulation of their rela-
tionship. Whether or not such an agreement ever existed, Pitt 
probably counted himself fortunate that Buddie agreed to ac-
cept this commission, given Buddie's pre-eminence in the coal 
industry. In Buddie, Pitt had obtained an agent of the very 
highest reputation. The impact of reputation in principal-agent 
relationships has not yet been subject to a great deal of scru-
tiny, but does have "potential implications for managerial ac-
counting research" [Baiman, 1990, p.357]. Baiman argues that 
relationships between "reputable" individuals have distinct ben-
efits over those between individuals without such reputations, 
including the reduction of the costs of drawing up contracts 
and collecting information, as well as by "increasing the set of 
8
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supportable actions." In a "reputable" relationship, the agent 
will be careful to maintain his reputation, since, inter alia, it 
affects his future earning power in other relationships, and the 
principal will act fairly as this helps him to secure the services 
of an agent with a reputation for profitable management and 
integrity. The acquisition of an agent of Buddie's reputation 
must be seen in the context of an industry where fraud and 
corruption were rampant. Reviewing the period up to 1700, 
Hatcher [1993, p.304] noted that major determinants of colliery 
profits were not only the owner's ability to track output and 
cash and to impose efficiency, but also his ability to limit fraud: 
the "control of fraud undoubtedly absorbed a disproportionate 
amount of energy and ingenuity." This concern continued to 
be a major pre-occupation in the coal industry throughout the 
period of the current study, and, in a letter to Buddie in 1824, 
Pitt [DRO NCB l/JB/1090] referred to two recently published 
treatises on the "abuses", "impositions and frauds" practised in 
the coal trade, and commented that "both (authors) assert, that 
more deception and cheating is practised on Tanfield Moor 
Coal in London than on any other." However, it is apparent that 
Buddie's reputation caused Pitt to place a great deal of faith 
and trust in him, and to delegate wide decision-making powers 
to him. In the matter of negotiations with Clayton over "fitting" 
fees, Pitt [ibid/10880] wrote to Buddie in February 1824, "I 
h o p e you will gain y o u r end in the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i th 
Mr.Clayton, pray let there be no reference to me, - you have 
carte blanche." Although, in May 1824, Pitt [ibid/1089] did sug-
gest that Buddie should reach a compromise with Clayton, this 
was one of the very few occasions when he made a direct con-
tribution to the management of Tanfield Moor affairs. Virtually 
the whole of Pitt's correspondence to Buddie [DRO/NCB/JB/ 
1088-1133] consists of requests for the remittance of funds and 
with Pitt's own personal financial situation. Pitt showed almost 
no interest in the operation of Tanfield Moor as a colliery or as 
a business venture; essentially he was interested only in the 
cash flow he could generate from Tanfield Moor. In practice, 
Pitt delegated full decision-making authority to Buddie; as he 
wrote [ibid, p. 1127] in 1830 in response to a minor manage-
ment recommendation made to him by Buddie, "Any recom-
mendation of yours has a claim to adoption on our part." 
Just as Pitt was prepared to delegate to Buddie, so Buddie 
was prepared to take the initiative in his dealings with Pitt. 
Whereas Pitt had imposed reporting and financial arrange-
9
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ments on Clayton, Buddie [NRO Bud/22. p.86] took the initia-
tive in setting out the arrangements that he considered satisfac-
tory, 
I have found from experience that the more my em-
ployers know of their own affairs and my manner of 
acting in them, the more comfortable and satisfactory 
it is to myself. I am therefore desirous in undertaking 
the trust, which you have so kindly reposed in me, to 
establish a system of management , and correspon-
dence, which may keep you in regular communication 
with your affairs in this quarter - not to teaze you with 
trifling matters but to give you sufficient information 
on all material points. 
In his review and analysis of the agency literature, Baiman 
[1990, p.363] addresses the question as to why the principal 
would ever find it in his best interests to delegate the choice of 
monitoring system to the agent. However, there is no evidence 
that, at Tanfield Moor, Pitt used the accounting and costing 
systems to monitor Buddie. The word "trust" appears to be a 
highly significant word in the context of this particular princi-
pal-agent relationship and the trust engendered by Buddie's 
reputation is an important theme running throughout the cur-
rent research. Thus both parties felt secure enough to allow the 
agent, rather than the principal, to implement not only ac-
counting arrangements but also banking procedures. At the out-
set, Buddie gave Pitt details of the banking arrangements he 
proposed to make and set out his plans to prepare a bank ac-
count for Pitt every 28 days, noting that the monthly cash flow 
would also provide "a tolerably accurate criterion of the actual 
profit of the colliery" [ibid, p.87]. Buddie set up this system of 
accounts [NRO, Bud 37/1-6] and, every 28 days, provided Pitt 
with accounts detailing transactions and balances with the 
coal-fitter and with the bank. Additionally, Pitt was provided 
with a statement showing period and cumulative sales to the 
coal-fitter, in physical and financial terms, a summary abstract 
of the bank account and a detailed abstract of cash payments in 
the period. Thus Buddie himself designed and operated the ac-
counting system he used in reporting to Pitt. However, from 
Pitt's viewpoint, useful checks were built into the system. 
Transactions with the bank and with the coal-fitter could, if 
required, be checked easily and independently of Buddie and at 
frequent, regular intervals. Although Buddie's monthly account-
ing system was not particularly innovative, as it simply built 
10
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upon and extended Tanfield Moor's existing systems, it did pro-
vide the absentee owner with information relevant to obtaining 
an overview of the business and its financial position, as well as 
checking up on his agent, although there is no evidence that 
Pitt ever used the information in these ways. 
It is apparent that Buddie was highly trusted, for in 1823 
Pitt agreed to Buddie's tactfully worded suggestion [NRO Bud/ 
22, p. 174] regarding the format and preparation of annual ac-
counts: 
It occurs to me that as good a Plan as any of choosing 
the Colliery Accts for the.... year will be to make out a 
Cash Account folio, a journal (and) a profit and loss 
Acct. The former will show the Cash Balance at the end 
of the year, and the latter by giving credit for all debts 
due, and charging all debts owing, will give a correct 
view of the Year's Profit....I shall however be very glad 
to adopt any other mode or form that you may prefer 
and shall feel obliged by any suggestion.... you (make) 
on this subject. Simplicity and clearness is what we 
ought to aim at, and by a little attention I hope we 
shall succeed...and in looking forward to the making 
up of the Yearly Book it has occurred to me that Mr 
Watson would be as proper a person as any other. 
Given that Buddie was responsible not only for the design 
of the annual accounting system, but also for the choice of the 
accountant who would undertake the preparation of accounts, 
Pitt appeared to repose a great deal of trust and confidence in 
him. The information supplied to Pitt in accounting form was 
supplemented by that contained in letters written to him by 
Buddie [NRO Bud/22]. The correspondence is voluminous and 
is biased in quantity, perhaps not unnaturally, towards the 
early years of the principal-agent relationship. However, the 
letter book is probably incomplete in that Buddie acknowledged 
to Pitt in 1824 that "I very seldom have an opportunity of keep-
ing copies of my letters to you" [ibid, p. 186]. Despite the fact 
that Buddie had established the system of reporting to Pitt by 
accounts and by letters, it is apparent that he did not feel con-
strained by it. It appears that although the accounts were al-
ways prepared and sent to Pitt, at times the letter-writing was 
limited, as Buddie noted to Pitt in 1827 [ibid, p.234]: 
It is now so long since you received a letter from me, 
that I am afraid you will begin to think me an idle 
fellow. The fact however is that I am more remiss in 
11
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writing than in acting - when I cannot manage both, 
the former "goes to the wall" and the latter has my 
exclusive attention. 
Thus the letter-writing system was not a rigid requirement 
imposed on the agent by the principal, but a. method of report-
ing that the agent used at his discretion. Although the letter 
book is probably incomplete, it is possible to gain from it an 
understanding of Buddie's concerns in the management of 
Tanfield Moor. There were four major areas of importance: pro-
duction, sales, transport and financial management. The cur-
rent research examines each of these areas and assesses 
Buddie's use of costing and accounting information in dealing 
with them. 
Production: In the late eighteenth century coal was ex-
tracted from Tanfield Moor by contractors. Although it cannot 
be dated precisely because of lack of archival evidence, this 
form of mining organisation was ended at Tanfield Moor by 
1822 [NRO, Bud 37/1]. Generally the practice had died out in 
the North-East by 1815, largely due to contractors' tendencies 
to exploit pits for their own short-term gains rather than the 
long-term benefit of owners [Taylor, 1960]. Thus Buddie was 
r e s p o n s i b l e for t he d i rec t m a n a g e m e n t of t he co l l ie ry 
workforce. Despite the fact that production was naturally of 
considerable importance at any colliery, Buddie spent remark-
ably little time reporting on it to Pitt, probably because it was a 
relatively problem-free area of colliery operations. In 1825, 
Buddie [NRO, Bud/22, p. 190] wrote to Pitt noting "I am happy 
to say that the state of the colliery underground is highly satis-
factory" and in 1827 [ibid, p.231] he commented that, as re-
gards production, "we are going on very well." Although the 
preparation of production cost analyses was a well-established 
practice in the North-East England coal mining industry, and 
such costings existed at Tanfield Moor as early as 1749 [NRO, 
Bud/25,p.31], Buddie devoted little costing effort to this area. 
Such costing was "extremely complicated" [Flinn, 1984, p.286] 
and Buddle may have decided not to undertake it, given his 
expert judgement of the satisfactory state of production matters 
and the very limited amount of time he could spend on Tanfield 
Moor's affairs. Buddie's satisfaction with mining operations 
may have been based not only on the expertise with which he 
directed them, but also by the way in which they were carried 
out by miners he selected and hired at the annual "binding". 
The management of labour relations in the coal mining indus-
12
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try of North-East England was an extremely difficult task. At 
times bindings and pay negotiations involved miners in strikes, 
lawlessness, carrying guns, physical violence and killings; coal 
owners backed their negotiations with the draconian penalties 
of the established legal system and the use of the militia [Jones, 
1986]. Buddie was a key figure in the industry and, as a nego-
tiator for the coal owners was an obvious target for the wrath of 
the mine-workers. However, he also inspired the respect and 
admiration of the workers. At times this proved rather over-
whelming, as in 1831 when he helped in the successful resolu-
tion of a bitter pay dispute and the workers wanted to carry 
him shoulder-high in procession from his home in Wallsend to 
Newcastle the regional capital five miles away [Colls, 1987, 
p.92]. Buddie won the respect of the "pitmen" not simply be-
cause of his managerial abilities, but for his attitude towards 
them and their work. He attached importance to the skills and 
qualities required of a "pitman" and maintained a strong com-
mitment to pit work. Although the region's other leading view-
ers no longer went underground in pursuit of their duties, 
Buddie continued to do so and after major accidents insisted 
upon being among the first to go down the pit to review the 
s i tua t ion . Thus a l though Buddie 's p rod uc t i on cost ing at 
Tanfield Moor was somewhat limited, it is probable that he 
more than compensated for this by the way in which he under-
took the direct management of the labour force. 
Sales ("the vend"): Between 1805-1830, the Joint Durham 
and Northumberland Coal Owners Association regulated "the 
vend" or sale of coal by fixing prices and establishing quotas for 
each colliery. In order to get their coal to market, the owners 
hired independent shipping agents, known as "fitters", who 
owned keels that transported the coal from the staithes down 
the River Tyne to waiting colliers. The fitter engaged the master 
of the colliery to carry the coal to market,' often down the East 
coast to London. At times competition between coal-dwners 
caused the system of regulation to break down, and open or 
"fighting" trade ensued. During these periods of open trade the 
formal regulat ion was replaced by a more flexible system 
known as "freighting" which entailed the shipment of coals to 
market and sale at whatever price could be obtained. The vend 
was all-important to Tanfield Moor's success. As Buddie noted 
[NRO, Bud/22, p. 191] since underground affairs were highly 
satisfactory, "our prosperity ... will depend entirely upon the 
extent of our vend." However, Buddie was faced with funda-
13
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mental problems in this sphere of his management as there was 
a limited demand for the type of coal mined at Tanfield Moor 
for, while much of the success of the North-East coal industry 
was based on high quality household coal, Tanfield Moor pro-
duced soft coal used by specialist manufacturers. This demand 
was limited at the best of times and even more so during 
recessionary periods such as those which saw the colliery's 
sales fall from approximately 17,000 chaldrons in 1831 to just 
over 13,000 chaldrons in 1833, a chaldron weighing approxi-
mately 6,000 pounds [Hiskey, 1978, p.73]. In these circum-
stances, Buddie was forced to use "freighting" as a means of 
maintaining sales. However when prices fell to particularly low 
levels Buddie [NRO, Bud/22, p.333] reported to Pitt that "to 
have pushed the vend under such circumstances would have 
been absolutely ruinous. I was glad therefore to work no more 
coals than barely necessary to occupy the establishment and 
allow the workmen a maintenance." Buddie did not refer to any 
financial analysis to support this decision and the archives do 
not contain any such explicit assessments. However, the regula-
tion of the vend had a dramatic impact on selling prices. In 
1834, freighting prices were 15s 3½d per chaldron, but, after 
the restoration of the regulation of the vend rose to 20s per 
chaldron. Nevertheless, Buddie did have the ability to influence 
sales price and volume by his management of the marketing 
system. For example, in 1835 he decided to consign all of 
Tanfield Moor's coals to one London factor rather than to sev-
eral, and, as a result of the concentration of business and the 
greater care and attention given to Tanfield Moor by this single 
factor, the coals began to sell at their full nominal price of 24s 
per chaldron, although Buddie still had to exercise discretion 
over the quantity of coal to send to the market [Hiskey, 1978, 
p.74] . Although the fortnightly repor ts may have enabled 
Buddie to keep very close track of vends and prices, there is 
little extant evidence to suggest that he employed more detailed 
ad hoc revenue-cost analysis in his sales management. Never-
theless, Buddie was capable of using cost data when he thought 
it necessary; for example in his negotiations with Clayton re-
garding the latter's "fitting" fees, he reported [ibid, p. 123] to 
Pitt: 
I took my particulars of my Estimate of the Cost of the 
Fitting Establishment; and wished Mr Clayton to dis-
cuss it item by item; but he was not sufficiently with 
the minutiae of the business, to enable him to do 
14
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so....if he can satisfy himself that my estimate is cor-
rect, he will be satisfied with it. 
However, underlying all the spheres of sales revenue and 
cost management lay the issue of corruption. The entire process 
of the coal industry, from mining through to distribution and 
marketing, created potential for abuse by agents. Some agents' 
"perquisites" were accepted throughout the industry: for ex-
ample viewers supplied owners with corving rods, used to make 
baskets for hauling coal underground, and in doing so made a 
profit for themselves. Buddie noted, perhaps somewhat coyly, 
that the costs of corving rods was "one of the secrets and myster-
ies of the profession" [quoted in Flinn, 1984, p.62]. However, 
although this benefit may have been viewed as legitimate, oth-
ers were more suspect. When coal was sold in the London mar-
ket, it went through a complex handling and marketing system 
that "creaked with corruption" [ibid, p.279] and systems nearer 
home were equally unsatisfactory. Buddie believed that fitting 
agents' clerks encouraged the use of freighting in order to ob-
tain substantial corrupt payments from shipmasters whose 
colliers would otherwise have been idle. He considered freight-
ing to be "a woeful practice, being injurious to the Trade at 
large as well as to the parties immediately concerned, and 
ought to be abolished" [ibid, p.272]. In 1823, Buddie com-
plained to Pitt that Clayton had taken unilateral action in con-
firming the colliery's agents on the London market "as much ... 
for the purpose of personal friendship, as for benefiting the 
Interests of the Colliery" [Bud/22, p118]. Given that Buddie had 
previously written warmly of Clayton [ibid, p.97] it appears un-
likely that this comment was generated by personal ill-will, but 
was simply a reflection of the moral hazards inherent in the 
industry's principal-agent relationships. In such circumstances, 
Buddie's outstanding reputation within the coal industry and 
his ability to inspire trust and confidence formed a valuable 
element of the principal-agent relationship. 
Transport : In the early eighteenth century, mining in 
North-East England was concentrated in a limited area of the 
upper River Tyne and its southern t r ibutar ies , the Rivers 
Derwent and Team [Flinn, 1984, p21]. This concentration was 
due to geographical, geological and technological factors: coal 
deposits could be worked in shallow mines sunk into steep val-
ley sides that allowed the natural drainage of water, other prac-
tical means of drainage not being available. By the early eigh-
teenth century these shallow mines were almost worked out, 
15
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and the coal-field was gradually extended towards the high land 
of the Tanfield area. Coal was plentiful in this area, but the 
geography of the land did pose fundamental problems. A sys-
tem of waggonways was necessary to transport coal to the 
Tyne, but "the configuration of this hilly country is such that 
these waggonways were inevitably channelled into the Derwent 
valley, a bottleneck in which wayleaves (permission for trans-
port) could be controlled relatively easily by a small number of 
landowners" [ibid, p.22]. A coal-owning partnership known as 
the Grand Alliance operated in the North-East, and the Allies 
often bought land and rented wayleaves "for the sole purpose of 
denying them to competi tors" [ibid, p.41]. One Ally, Lord 
Ravensworth, controlled wayleaves vital to the t ransport of 
Tanfield Moor's coal and, in February 1827, Buddie [NRO, Bud/ 
22, pp.218-9] informed Pitt that the "increased....wayleave to 
Lord Ravensworth and others is...a heavy tax upon us. This 
...has cut down the profit of 1826 most cruelly." However 
Buddie was willing to use his social standing to gain advantage 
for Pitt, a reversal of the more usual situation whereby an agent 
tried to generate social contacts and derive benefits from the 
principal 's higher status and wider contacts [Cowton and 
O'Shaughnessy, 1991, p.40]. In 1827, Buddie was included in 
the social gatherings to celebrate the visit of the Duke of 
Wellington to the North-East and took the opportunity to de-
velop influential contacts. Thus, in October 1827, he was able to 
write [NRO, Bud/22, p.235] to Pitt stating that: 
I am now on terms of intimacy...with Lord and Lady 
Ravensworth...and don't despair of being able, by and 
by, to induce his lsp. to relax a little in the amot. of 
wayleave with which he has saddled us. 
The monthly reports [NRO, Bud 37/1-6] provided summa-
ries of actual wayleave and transport costs and, as part of his 
management of these important areas, Buddie also prepared 
detailed ad hoc costings [NRO, Bud/22, p.279] and cost esti-
mates [NRO, Bud/22, pp.296; 301-3]. Transport costs and, 
hence, colliery profitability were influenced tremendously by 
technological development. An early instance had been the 
change from transport by road to movement by "rail" transport 
in which horses pulled coal wagons along wooden rails or 
"waggonways" to the staithes, or loading points, on the River 
Tyne. It had been estimated in 1711 that road transport from 
Tanfield Moor to the Tyne resulted in a profit of £1.17.6 per 
16
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"ten,", a standard unit of measurement, and that transport by 
waggonway would increase profit to £5.5.9 per "ten" [Flinn, 
1984, p. 149]. In Buddie's era, two significant developments in 
transport technology were the development of railways and the 
use of "spouts" at the staithes, enabling direct loading onto 
colliers rather than via the intermediary of keel boats. In 1823 
Buddie investigated the possibility of building a railway line to 
the Tyne and prepared a detailed cost estimate [NRO, Bud/22, 
p. 126] showing a total project cost of over £39,000. However, 
this project was shelved, perhaps because of Pitt's lack of capi-
tal and the failure of negotiations with prospective partners 
[Hiskey, 1978, p.72]. 
Buddie continued to use waggonways to transport Tanfield 
Moor's coal until the early 1830s when the use of railways be-
came a very real prospect. Buddie was the viewer for the 
collieries of the Stanhope and Tyne Railway Company and was 
involved in the calculation of the railway's quotation of 8s 3½d 
per chaldron for leading the coals to the Tyne and shipping 
them by spout. However, after receiving an offer from a rival 
railway company, Buddie succeeded in renegotiating a price of 
6s 3d per chaldron with the Stanhope and Tyne. "The new lead-
ing charge, free of fixed annual wayleaves...amounted to a 4/-
reduction per chaldron on the old leading costs" [ibid, p73]. 
Buddie [NRO, Bud/22, p.322] was in no doubt as to the impor-
tance of this arrangement, claiming that "it amounts to a reno-
vation of the colliery, and will I trust enable it to live." Thus, in 
his management of transport costs, Buddie was aided both by 
the costing exercises he undertook at Tanfield Moor and by his 
standing and influence in the coal industry. 
Financial management: Buddie's continuing concern in fi-
nancial management was to generate sufficient cash flow to 
cover the colliery's wage bills and other operational payments 
and to provide remittances to Pitt. However, it is probable that 
the requirements of Buddie's monthly accounting system also 
shaped Tanfield Moor's cash flows, particularly in relation to 
wage bills. Although it was common practice in the North-East 
to pay colliery workers on a fortnightly basis, Buddie [NRO, 
Bud/22, p.87] chose to introduce a variant to this system: 
...28 days is named as the (accounting) period....be-
cause it its the custom to pay the colliers every 14 days; 
but I only mean to pay the other classes of workmen 
every 28 days. This will very much simplify the Cash 
17
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Acct. as I shall just have 12 monthly receipts of Mr 
Clayton (the fitter) and 13 lunar payments in the year. 
Buddie also cited the need to maintain the monthly prepa-
ration of accounts as being the key factor underlying his accep-
tance of Clayton's stance in the negotiation of the fitting charge. 
He reported [ibid, p. 160] to Pitt 
You will no doubt think this rather soft on my part, but 
the fact is that I could not otherwise bring the matter 
to a close with Mr C. and might have (negotiated) on 
with him for the whole year which would have pre-
vented me from Closing my Monthly Statements, in a 
satisfactory manner. 
Buddie regarded the timely preparation of monthly accounts as 
a matter of some importance and aimed to have those accounts 
in Pitt's hands in a matter of days after the month-end [ibid, 
p. 153]. Thus, it is clear that Buddie considered that the monthly 
accounts were a key element in the principal-agent reporting 
relationship, as well as a necessary aid to his own cash flow 
management of the colliery. In writing to Pitt, Buddie [ibid, 
p.206] sometimes forecast cash flows several months ahead and 
reported on his negotiations with Ridleys, the local bankers, to 
obtain advances and overdrafts. However, Buddie's problems in 
cash flow management were compounded by the nature of the 
regional banking system. In 1826 he reported [ibid, p.206] to 
Pitt: 
I enclose a letter I have received this morning from our 
Bankers. I called upon them yesterday to make ar-
rangements for remitting...£1,200 ... when to my great 
disappointment they told me it was not in their power 
to fulfil their promise in consequence of want of public 
confidence in their notes. A constant run continues 
upon all our Banks and Ridleys are paying away 1000 
sovereigns or Bank of England notes a day to take up 
their own notes, which are scarcely well out of the 
Bank before they are bro t back again for gold....They 
are afraid to pass their notes to their Customers to 
make the Colliery pays, and we are all under the most 
serious apprehension that we shall not long be able to 
obtain a sufficient quantity of £1 notes to pay the 
wages of the pitmen - as to obtaining (gold) sovereigns 
for the purpose, that seems quite out of the question as 
scarcely one is to be seen in circulation, altho' since the 
beginning of December the Newcastle Bank has freed 
18
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more than £200,000. The unfavourable state of affairs 
is compelling the Bankers to call in all their advances... 
the Commercial affairs of the county are getting into 
the most embarrassing state imaginable and we are 
menaced with the melancholy prospect of an almost 
entire suspension of business. 
In these difficult circumstances, Pitt may have been com-
forted by the knowledge that he had entrusted his affairs into 
the hands of the industry's most outstanding and respected pro-
fessional. Despite the vagaries of the banking system and the 
coal mining industry, Tanfield Moor continued in business and 
Buddie continued to emphasise short-term cash management in 
order to meet the operational needs of the colliery and to remit 
cash surpluses to the owner, although there does not appear to 
have been any mechanism to set aside funds to meet the long-
term capital development of the colliery, probably because such 
expenditures were minimal and could be met out of current 
cash flows. 
Cash management may have been facilitated by the credit 
terms available in the coal mining industry but credit arrange-
ments may have accentuated the need for accrual accounting at 
the year end. In 1824 Buddie [NRO, Bud/22, p. 176] noted that: 
It is not customary in Colliery affairs to pay off trades-
men within the Year in which the goods are obtained... 
any Credit for Iron, Ropes and Prop. wood is 6 months 
but more frequently Twelve. 
A possible implication of this particular letter is that, prior 
to the engagement of Buddie, Tanfield Moor Colliery had not 
been adopting the usual credit terms and, thus, Buddie's insis-
tence on them may have helped to regulate cash flows. Further-
more, Buddie employed his extensive business and social net-
work to preserve Pitt 's cash resources from unscrupulous 
taxation officials. Buddie [ibid, p. 161-2] wrote to Pitt that: 
I happen to be intimate with the Surveyor General of 
the Taxes in this District. I spent last evening with him 
and asked him if any advantage would arise to you 
from entering your Colliery establishment in Dorset-
shire (Pitt's home area). He replied certainly not....I 
told him that your surveyor was of the opinion that 
some benefit would accrue from having the whole of 
your establishment, Colliery and all, in one return. He 
replied that the only person who could be benefited.... 
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would be the surveyor or collector himself whose per 
centage would be increased by the augmentation of the 
tax schedule. 
Thus, in terms of financial management, Buddie brought 
valuable knowledge, contacts and authority to bear in the pur-
suit of his principal's interests, in addition to implementing a 
monthly accounting system that aided financial management 
and reporting to the principal. 
The annual accounts were employed little in the manage-
ment of the colliery, but did keep the principal informed of 
annual profit or loss: 1824 £6,374; 1825 £4,490; 1826 £3,747; 
1827 £5,591; 1828 £2,934; [Flinn, 1984, p.321] 1829 £107; 1830 
£1358; 1833 £774 (loss); [Hiskey, 1978, p.75]. The 1824 results 
reflected Buddie's first year in complete effective control of 
Tanfield Moor and Pitt expressed his thanks for Buddie's "ex-
traordinary exertions" and his "real surprise" at the amount of 
profit. The declining level of profits from 1829 onwards were 
due largely to the marketing and pricing problems caused by 
recession and the decline in the "Regulation of the Vend" [ibid, 
p.75]. 
CONCLUSIONS 
At Tanfield Moor, accounting systems were developed to 
ensure regular, routine reporting by the agent to the principal 
and to provide useful management information to the agent. As 
agent, Buddie also prepared ad hoc costings to help him deal 
with specific problems, for example in transportation. However, 
where he judged operations to be satisfactory he did not employ 
cost data. This non-use of cost data was probably a deliberate 
choice on Buddie's part and is not indicative of any lack of 
knowledge or ability in handling such data. Thus, the current 
research does indicate that accounts were used as direct aids to 
management at Tanfield Moor, and, taken in the context of the 
well-established and widespread accounting and costing prac-
tices of the North-East England coal-field, does challenge 
Fleischman and Parker's expectation that "nascent cost ac-
counting would flourish more notably in a factory environ-
ment" [1991, p.363] than in extractive industries. The current 
author's preliminary surveys of the Northumberland Record Of-
fice and the Durham Record Office, and reading of the existing 
literature [Flinn, 1984; Hatcher, 1993; Oldroyd, 1996] suggest 
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that further research [e.g. Fleischman and Parker, forthcoming] 
might overturn this expectation. 
Principal-agent relationships were vital to organisational 
control at Tanfield Moor, and the systems of accounting, cost-
ing and correspondence combined to keep the principal well 
appraised of his agent's management of the colliery. However a 
distinctive feature of the relationship between Buddie and Pitt 
was the freedom the agent had to develop systems and take 
managerial decisions that he thought were appropriate. There 
is no evidence that Pitt ever used any of the available informa-
tion to monitor Buddie in any way. At the heart of this relation-
ship was Buddie's reputation and the authority of Buddie as an 
expert and as a man. It has been argued [Otley, 1980] that 
accounting is simply one feature in the control structure of an 
organisation and that this control structure also includes fea-
tures such as personnel selection. In the case of Tanfield Moor, 
the appointment as agent of a man of Buddie's reputation lay at 
the core of the control structure and was probably of greater 
significance than the development of systems of accounting, 
costing and correspondence. 
The findings of the current research may be related to re-
search undertaken on more recent control structures in coal 
mining. After World War II, the British coal mining industry 
was nationalised and a National Coal Board [NCB] was formed. 
Berry et al [1985] conducted a study of an area of the NCB 
during the early 1980s and found that although financial plan-
ning and control systems existed they were not the primary 
form of organisational control. Production and technological 
considerations were in the forefront and a set of cultural rather 
than financial values pervaded the organisation, emphasising 
the loyalty and support of managers for miners who did a diffi-
cult job in dangerous conditions. However, by the mid-1990s, 
the privatisation program of the Conservative government had 
ensured dismemberment of the nationalised industry and the 
restoration of private ownership. A potential avenue for future 
research might involve an examination of any changes in finan-
cial, organisational and cultural value systems consequent upon 
the privatisation of the British coal-mining industry. 
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